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Abstract 
It is widely acknowledged that the theoretical perspectives that inform demographic inquiry 
have often come from elsewhere. While economic theory and econometric methods has 
played a particularly prominent role in the development of some areas of study, including 
the family, demography has remained remarkably impervious to the theoretical 
interventions of feminism and other critical perspectives. In this chapter, the author aims to 
demonstrate how demographic research would benefit from a more conscious consideration 
of a wider range of theoretical perspectives. To this end, she focuses primarily on one 
particular (broad and flexible) critical analytic concept – intersectionality – and one 
particular area of enquiry: the study of the family. Intersectionality, which Leslie McCall 
described as "...one of the most important theoretical contributions of Women's Studies, 
along with racial and ethnic studies, so far." (1771), has been a fleet-footed traveler in the 
past couple of decades, but it has not, for some reason, crossed our disciplinary boundary. It 
is noteworthy that we see virtually no references to “intersectionality” on the pages of 
demography journals. For this reason, the chapter begins with a brief introduction to the 
concept of intersectionality, focusing on the issues most relevant to quantitative research, 
which  outlines its theoretical premise and traces out some of the broad methodological 
implications. Next, concrete examples illustrate how the application of intersectionality, as 
a critical and reflective lens, could contribute to the way demographers study families and 
family policies. The overarching aim is to initiate a discussion amongst the demographic 
community about the productive potential of adopting a more critical and interdisciplinary 
theoretical perspective. 
1.  Introduction 
In his 1995 Plenary to the European Population Conference entitled “God Has Chosen to 
Give the Easy Problems to the Physicists: Or Why Demographers Need Theory”, Guillaume 
Wunsch observed that “Demography has never had a grand explanatory paradigm, such as 
the postulate of rationality and the concept of utility in microeconomics…” (3. Do 
Demographers Have Theories, para 1). He went on to argue that “The lack of a grand 
unified approach is not necessarily a disadvantage…” (para 3) but it does mean that “that 
demographers have to cannibalize other fields of inquiry, in order to found their 
explanations” (para 4). I appreciate Wunsch’s carefully chosen and evocative turn of 
phrase, even if, from a different vantage point, and one which benefits from an additional 
two decades’ hindsight, it is not exactly the imagery I would choose.  I have tended to think 
of demographers less as a tribe of cannibals and rather more as a colonized people1. But 
let’s set that distinction aside, at least for now. Whether it has been ingested, plundered, or 
thrust upon us, the theoretical perspectives that inform demographic inquiry have often 
come from elsewhere. Few would argue, I think, that economics has played a particularly 
prominent role in the development of some areas of study, including family demography. 
Just a few years before Wunsch delivered his plenary, Eileen Crimmins (1993) 
surveyed three decades of work published in the journal Demography and outlined 
intellectual developments in the field. She cites the "growing influence of economists and 
economic modelling" (585) as one of the explanations for changes in "the theoretical 
models guiding demographic analysis" (585).  As new theoretical priorities gained 
                                                            
1 This imagery is far from original. See, for example Loriaux and Vichnevshaia 2006, p 871 
influence, so too did their associated methodological approaches. Crimmins observes that, 
in the early years of the journal, a relatively large share of studies involved the analysis of 
vital statistics and census data, with groups rather than individuals as the unit of analysis. 
By the early 1990s, she describes nothing short of a sea change in the methodology of social 
demography2: “We have moved from descriptive methods and data to analysis that is based 
largely on the application of causal models. The availability of certain types of data and the 
power to easily apply complex statistical techniques have encouraged the development of 
methods appropriate to this emphasis on causal models.” (1993: 585). We entered what she 
called the “era of the independent variable” (585),  a development marked by the rapid 
increase in the number of studies making use of multivariate regression techniques, with a 
trend towards increasingly long lists of (most typically additive and separable) control 
variables. This latter development, in particular, meant that the empirical models presented 
in social demographic research came to look and feel far less distinct from the reduced form 
models that were being estimated by many applied micro-economists (Sigle-Rushton 2014).  
I have reflected a good deal on what these new  meant for the way demographic research 
has evolved (see, for example, Sigle-Rushton 2012). I find it noteworthy that this 
transformation coincided with theoretical developments in the social sciences, such as the 
elaboration of intersectionality which, if contemplated, could have motivated, at the very 
least, a critical pause.    
It is not so much the incorporation of economic theories and methods that troubles 
me, but rather their predominance. I won’t pretend that I don’t have some particular 
concerns about its “grand explanatory paradigm” and (even more) its methodological 
preoccupation with issues of selection and causation (Sigle-Rushton 2012), but I would be 
                                                            
2 Crimmins distinguishes social and formal demography in her discussion, and social demography and I 
adopt her terminology here.   
just as concerned about the hegemonic rise of any particular discipline or theoretical 
perspective. As we become increasingly comfortable with particular tools and methods it is 
all too easy to start to apply them as a matter of routine, to stop questioning whether and 
why they are appropriate for our particular purposes. When this happens, the value of 
utilizing an explicit theoretical or conceptual framework – the self-reflection and the outside 
scrutiny that is invites and facilitates – is compromised. We might, for example, fail to 
notice the way a particular perspective lends legitimacy to biases and chauvinism. Arland 
Thornton’s (2001) incisive critique of developmental idealism and the methodology of 
reading history sideways that it legitimates is a salutary reminder that, even without an 
explicit theoretical frame, we impose meaning in ways that determine how we describe, 
interpret and seek to effect change in the world around us. The solution is not to abandon 
theory but to use it reflexively. 
 This is why I think it is important to ask why mainstream (and quantitative) 
demography has remained remarkably impervious to the theoretical interventions of 
feminism and other critical perspectives (Riley and McCarthy 2003). Previous writers have 
suggested this might have been a conscious decision: “demography is highly invested in 
deflecting critical theories, including feminism, that highlight the political nature of science 
precisely because its theories, research questions, and applications are so very political” 
(Williams 2010, pg 200).However, if that is the case, I wonder why social policy has not 
been equally resistant. Scholars in social policy (as well as political science, sociology, and 
family studies) study demographic processes and ask some of the same research questions 
that demographers do. As a field rather than a discipline in its own right, social policy has 
also had to look to other disciplines for much of its theory. Like demography, the influence 
of economics has figured prominently. However, in the past quarter of a century, feminist 
theoretical perspectives and methodologies have shaped the intellectual trajectory of 
mainstream social policy (Orloff 1996; 2009).  Even if some authors suggest that the 
integration of feminist concerns has been partial and incomplete (Brush 2002; Orloff 2009), 
critical and feminist perspectives have left a more discernible mark on mainstream social 
policy research than can be observed in mainstream social demography. This puzzles me. 
In this chapter, my aim is to demonstrate how demographic research would benefit 
from a more conscious consideration of a wider range of theoretical perspectives.  To 
illustrate what I mean, I focus primarily on one particular (broad and flexible) critical 
analytic concept – intersectionality – and I draw examples from my own particular area of 
demographic inquiry: the study of families and family policy. Intersectionality, which 
Leslie McCall (2005) described as "...one of the most important theoretical contributions of 
Women's Studies, along with racial and ethnic studies, so far." (1771),  has been a fleet-
footed traveler in the past couple of decades, but it has not, for some reason, crossed our 
disciplinary boundary. It is noteworthy that we see virtually no references to 
“intersectionality” on the pages of demography journals.3 For this reason, I think it is 
sensible to begin in the next section with a brief introduction to the concept of 
intersectionality, focusing on the issues that I see as most relevant to quantitative research in 
demography. I outline its theoretical premise and then trace out some of the methodological 
implications. By illustrating some of the ways that intersectionality could contribute to the 
study of particular topics or questions, my aim is to initiate a discussion amongst the 
demographic community about the productive potential of adopting a more critical and 
interdisciplinary theoretical perspective.   
                                                            
3 Not a single study was returned when I searched (on the publishers’ web pages) the online content of 
Demography, Demographic Research, Population and Development Review, the European Journal for 
Population Studies for the term “intersectionality”. 
2. Theoretical Overview and Methodological Implications 4 
2.1 Intersectionality: Its intellectual development and premise5 
Intersectionality is a concept, or perhaps even a research paradigm6 (Hancock 2007b), that 
developed over many decades. It encompasses a number of ideas about the complex 
multidimensionality of subjectivity and social stratification and the consequences of its 
misspecification. Its origins can be traced back to an “internal critique and self-reflection of 
the imagined community of feminism” (Knapp 2005: 260). A number of interventions, 
some of the most prominent of which came from Black feminist scholars and activists 
(Nash 2008), illustrated how the same exclusionary practices that allowed (some privileged 
groups of) men to lay claim to the term “humanity” could be identified in the way some 
privileged (white, able-bodied, middle class, heterosexual) feminists made use of the term 
“woman”.  These assessments, which rely on an understanding of analytic categories as 
socially defined, draw attention to the process of categorization as an act of power and 
exclusion. It follows that the meanings attached to categories cannot be taken as given but 
must be understood as reflecting a particular (dominant) perspective (Zinn and Dill 1996).  
Categorical boundaries reflect and reify social hierarchies in a given  time and place. 
However, once particular categorical boundaries are established, it is the experiences and 
                                                            
4 The presentation and discussion of intersectionality and its methodology draws heavily on Sigle-
Rushton (2014) and Sigle-Rushton and Lindstrom (2012). See Brah and Phoenix (2004) for a detailed and 
comprehensive intellectual history. 
5 The presentation and discussion of intersectionality and its methodology draws heavily on Sigle-
Rushton (2014) and Sigle-Rushton and Lindstrom (2012). See Brah and Phoenix (2004) for a detailed and 
comprehensive intellectual history. 
6 According to Hancock (2007a), a paradigm comprises “a set of basic beliefs or a worldview that 
precedes any questions of empirical investigation” (64). 
political priorities of the more powerful members that determine how a particular group 
understands and represents itself, effectively occluding those of the less powerful, multiply 
marginalized, constituents. Spelman  (1988) cites the dominance of a racially privileged 
perspective in feminist scholarship  in the United States as an illustration of this kind of 
exclusionary process : 
Much of feminist theory has reflected and contributed to what Adrienne Rich calls 
“white solipsism”: the tendency to “think, imagine, and speak as if whiteness 
defined the world.”  While solipsism is “not the consciously held belief that one 
race is inherently superior to all others, but a tunnel-vision which simply does not 
see non-white experience or existence as precious or significant, unless in 
spasmodic, impotent guilt-reflexes, which have little or no long-term continuing 
momentum or usefulness.”  (116). 
She argues that “white solipsism” has, in turn, shaped “habits of thought about the source of 
women’s oppression and the possibility for our liberation” in a way that has limited the 
“explanatory and descriptive scope” (116) of feminist interventions. Although it was not the 
central focus of her analysis, Spelman (1988) noted that class contributes another form 
solipsism.  In the context of social and demographic research, I think the influence of class, 
as well as geo-political location, merits careful consideration since these divisions so often 
set the feminist demographer (or social researcher more generally) apart from the subject of 
her analysis.   
As these reflections were articulated and refined, some scholars turned their 
attention to how multiple social dimensions were conceptualized in academic studies, when 
they were considered at all.  The simplifying - but erroneous - assumption that various axes 
of difference could be treated as separable and additive was extensively critiqued. 
Spelman’s (1988) Inessential Woman provided one of the earliest and most comprehensive 
assessments of this exclusionary practice. The assumption of separability implies that 
experiences of sexism and racism can be meaningful examined in isolation.7 It suggests we 
can somehow isolate “sexism” by focusing on the experiences of (white) women who are 
otherwise privileged. Similarly, we can isolate “racism” by focusing the experiences of 
ethnic minority men. This “but for” (Crenshaw 1989) strategy becomes especially 
problematic when comparisons of the most privileged with the otherwise privileged are 
assumed to apply generally and so can be extrapolate to other oppressed groups like “pop-
beads” (Spelman 1988)  as and when they apply. This additive, pop-bead approach erases 
the distinct experiences of the multiply marginalized. In the case of Black women, the 
possibility that the gendered experiences differ from those of white women or that their 
racial oppression differs from that experienced by Black men is simply assumed away.  The 
same additive-separable logic  - that there is  pure sex effect that applies “all else equal” -- 
underpins the specification of linear regression models which include a separate “sex” 
indicator and a separate “ethnicity” categorical variable (Sigle-Rushton 2014). However 
with statistical models and methods, the most numerous groups tend to have the largest 
impact on the parameter estimates, and it is small and rare groups (still often the multiply-
marginalized) whose experiences may be misrepresented and misunderstood. 
The additive-separable logic and its associated methodology is not merely a 
convenient (if potentially problematic) academic invention or idiosyncrasy. It is a 
                                                            
7 This way of thinking, while erroneous, is nonetheless widespread and taken for granted.  We see it 
reflected both in the way academic studies are carried out but also in the meta-data that is used to classify 
studies.  For example, the JEL subcodes for Demographic Economics (J1) include separate categories for 
studies of age (J12), gender (J13) and ethnicity (J14), reinforcing the perception that it is valid, and 
indeed possible, to examine any one of these in isolation (Sigle-Rushton 2014). 
widespread but often implicit schema that organizes representations of and responses to 
social issues (Crenshaw 1991). It makes it possible to ask, as many did during the Obama-
Clinton race for the democratic nomination, whether America is more racist or sexist 
(Hancock 2007a). It is a way of thinking that is reflected in and supported by social 
structures and institutions. For example, Crenshaw (1989) demonstrates how African 
American women seeking redress for discrimination were forced to base their claim on 
either sex discrimination or race discrimination, a constraint which determined the 
comparator that would be used as evidence. Citing the case of DeGraffenreid v General 
Motors, she shows how the court refused to allow the plaintiffs to argue that they faced a 
combination of sex and race discrimination. Such a claim, the court stated, went beyond 
what the drafters of the legislation intended. The implications of this reasoning are 
significant. As Crenshaw (1989) suggests, it: “…implies that the boundaries of sex and race 
discrimination doctrine are defined respectively by white women’s and Black men’s 
experiences. Under this view, Black women are protected only to the extent that their 
experiences coincide with those of either of the two groups.Where their experiences are 
distinct, Black women can expect little protection…” (59).   
Crenshaw’s  contribution has the added distinction of providing “intersectionality” 
with its name.  Developed and deployed over most of its history without a label or name 
attached to them,  the term “….provided a much-needed frame of reference for the 
comparison and negotiation of various endeavours, opening up space for critical dialogue" 
(Sigle-Rushton and Lindstrom 2013, pg. 130). Although it remains a rather loosely defined 
concept or set of ideas, its main theoretical premise, as I have come to understand it in my 
own work (Sigle-Rushton and Lindstrom 2013; Sigle-Rushton 2014), is that analytic 
categories and concepts (hierarchies, axes of differentiation, axes of oppression, social 
structures, normativities) are socially constructed and mutually modifying. If we accept that 
basic premise, we immediately encounter a number of methodological dilemmas that, while 
potentially productive, cannot be completely resolved.  
2.2 Methodological Implications 
Intersectionality is a methodologically demanding research paradigm that lacks a clearly 
specified methodology (Nash 2008). This is, I think, more or less inevitable. As a 
demographer who uses large scale secondary data to study families and family policy, I 
struggle to envision just what it would mean for me  to do a quantitative intersectional 
study. It is telling, I think, that McCall’s (2005) careful methodological reflection focuses 
not on a methodology of intersectionality, but rather on approaches for dealing with the 
(inevitable and enormous) complexity it evokes. When multiple social dimensions are 
understood as mutually modifying (and so, in statistical parlance, fully interacted), the 
amount of information that we must collect and interpret (and without resorting to any 
exclusionary overgeneralization) quickly becomes intractable. Taken to its logical limit, we 
would end up splitting our samples into increasingly detailed groups until there is nothing 
left to study (Young 1994). Nonetheless, we can be more or less intersectional in our 
thinking and approach.   
Accepting the basic premise of intersectionality means acknowledging that it is 
(potentially) problematic to conceptualize individuals, or any broad category of individuals, 
such as “women”, as a homogenous group.  Applied to quantitative analysis, it underscores 
the need to exercise care when extrapolating from what we observe on average, at the 
population or group level, to particular sub-groups. Because it is concerned with the 
exclusions and loss of information involved when a diversity of subjects are treated as 
similar, or as similarly situated, intersectionality directs our attention both towards the 
wider social and economic context and to individual level heterogeneity within any 
particular context (Bose 2012). A consideration of intersectionality’s basic tenets, therefore, 
directs our attention towards the specification, interpretation and use of categories as well as 
the explicit and implicit assumptions we make about how they relate to one another.  It is 
through its application as a critical lens – a “frame checker” and “method checker” (Garry 
2011: 830) -- that I have come to think that intersectionality has the most to contribute to 
the way research is designed and conducted in quantitative disciplines like demography.   
3. Methodological Implications: Dilemmas, Opportunities, and Insights 
In this section, I consider how a more conscious consideration of critical theoretical 
perspectives like intersectionality could extend and enrich demographic enquiry. Put 
simply, intersectionality asks us to consider the consequences of what happens when 
heterogeneity is ignored or made visible. This requires a (renewed) effort to assessing 
patterns of difference which might otherwise be hidden and to remain attentive to issues of 
diversity and exclusion at all stages of the research process. If demographers took  these 
commitments seriously, the primacy of economic  models, priorities, and methodologies 
might be disrupted and, in the process, open up space for the development of a more varied, 
creative and critical approach to research.  
3.1 Assessing Difference 
Intersectionality reminds us to remain ever vigilant to the fact that categorization and 
assumptions of additive-separability  are strategies for managing difference. Decisions we 
make about how to manage difference have consequences for what we see and how we 
understand and interpret social phenomena. At the same time, it is also important to stress 
that its contribution as a critical methodological lens should guide the search for additional 
complexity rather than impose or stipulate it. The art of model building and theory will 
always require some amount of simplification. We should decide which combined 
characteristics to consider with some care, and we should remove unnecessary complexity 
when there is not substantive or substantial loss of meaning (Sigle-Rushton 2014; Hobcraft 
and Sigle-Rushton 2012).  However, such decision-making requires a detailed descriptive 
foundation so that the conceptual and methodological implications of any simplifying 
assumption can be carefully considered. It calls for doing more than simply acknowledge 
heterogeneity. We must attempt to locate, understand, and explain it, as an integral and 
early stage of the research process and with reference to the particular research aims and 
objectives.   
McCall (2005) describes two methodological approaches which can be used 
strategically and pragmatically to guide this sort of exploration: the inter-categorical 
approach and the intra-categorical approach.8 She uses the term “inter-categorical” to refer 
to a largely descriptive endeavour that examines how analytical categories – gender, 
ethnicity, social class, and age – interact to produce particular patterns of inequality. In an 
effort to document complex inequalities, some researchers have estimated standard linear 
regression models with high order interaction terms (see, for example, McCall 2000; 2001). 
In a study that used this approach to examine the relationship between motherhood and 
employment in the UK, Diane Perrons and I  (2006) showed how ethnic differentials in the 
employment rates of mothers of young children are not uniform across educational groups. 
We were also able to document variation within broad categories – such as Asian or Black - 
that are commonly used in British social research.The findings from such descriptive efforts 
can be used in a number of ways. However, the results of models with a large number of 
                                                            
8 She also outlines a third approach to the complexity of intersectionality which she calls anti-categorical.  
This approach aims to deconstruct categories and so strip them of their power and meaning.  While this 
approach can offer useful insights into the way we attach meaning to or interpret categories, this approach 
has less to offer researchers interested in identifying meaningful interactions. 
interactions can be difficult to interpret and present to readers, which, as McCall (2005) 
cautions, can be an impediment to publication. In previous work,  I have suggested that a 
wider range of methodologies could be considered (Sigle-Rushton 2014).  Nonetheless, in a 
discipline where the identification of causal relationships has become a priority and where 
the contribution of studies which are  ‘merely descriptive’ is often called into question, it 
may be difficult to captivate readers with a detailed discussion of inter-categorical 
complexity regardless of how well the results are distilled and presented. For this reason, it 
may be strategic to frame the discussion around the implications for the study of particular 
research questions.Hill Collins (1999) suggests an incremental approach where the 
researcher takes as her starting point  “a concrete topic that is already the subject of 
investigation and … find the combined effects of race, class, gender, sexuality, and nation, 
where before only one or two interpretive categories were used.” (278). The approach she 
advocates would complement and refine existing research efforts rather than challenge 
them. 
The intra-categorical approach, which draws on the epistemological contributions of 
standpoint feminisms,  involves a narrow and intensive analysis of an outlier. At the macro-
level, this outlier could be a particular country that appears “puzzling” in some way. At the 
micro-level it would involve, as Crenshaw (1989) advocated, a  focus on a particular, 
multiply marginalized group whose experiences may have been previously oversimplified 
or overlooked. Case studies are often the methodology of choice  (Few-Demo 2014): 
comparisons with some more broadly defined category to which an outlier belongs provides 
opportunities to identify differences that may be theoretically (outliers) or substantively (the 
multiply marginalized) relevant (Sigle-Rushton and Lindstrom 2013). When this approach 
involves close scrutiny of small and rare groups, those with combinations of characteristics 
that would be not be (well) represented in secondary survey data, more narrative and 
qualitative approaches have been employed with good effect (Few-Demo 2014).   
The “intra-categorical” approach (McCall 2005) stands in stark contrast to the 
ceteris paribus approach characteristic of linear regression modelling, where the distinctive 
experiences of special groups or outliers are seen as something to be expunged or controlled 
as a confounding effect. However, it represents a way of thinking and an approach to 
research that has the potential to make a significant theoretical contribution. At a macro-
level, we see it reflected, for example, in Caldwell’s (1986) classic exploration of the 
relationship between GDP and health which focused intensively on high achievers – those 
countries with better than expected health given their national income.A similar logic might 
inspire a close consideration of groups such as non-white, migrants from poorer countries 
who have settled within a particular destination country, like the UK. This group, which is 
often observed to have better than average health and health behaviors than the more 
advantaged, native population, could provide meaningful information as high achievers at 
the micro-level. However as a small group, their experiences – a limited marital status 
differential, for example - are occluded when estimation methods that rely on population 
averages are utilized (Sigle-Rushton and Goisis 2014).   
To illustrate the utility of thinking carefully about both inter- and intra-categorical 
difference, consider the following example from my own research.Suppose we consider that 
the moderate fertility/ high employment9 group of European countries includes both the 
Scandinavian countries and England and Wales in its ranks.Although in recent years, 
entitlements to paid leave have been extended and improved, the British family policy 
                                                            
9 France and Ireland, have relatively high fertility as well (Sobotka 2004), but their female employment 
rates are closer to the EU average. 
model remains far less generous, and so much less expensive, than the family policy 
packages that characterize the Scandinavian countries. If we think that generous family 
policy and fertility rates are (or should be) associated, England and Wales could, to use 
Caldwell’s terminology, be characterized as a high achiever. In a case study of England and 
Wales that I carried out a few years ago (Sigle-Rushton 2008; 2009), I suggested that the 
UK exhibits a qualitatively different version of “moderately high fertility” than what is 
observed in the Scandinavian countries. The use of an inter-categorical lens directed my 
attention to the “fertility-relevant structuring effects” (Neyer and Andersson 2008: 707) of 
family policy on particular groups of individuals. I described a moderately high but 
relatively disadvantaged (as measured by education level) fertility profile (as measured by 
the TFR) compared to other moderately high fertility countries (see also Rendall et al 2010). 
If the pattern of moderately high fertility is qualitatively different across countries, there 
might be multiple paths to the same fertility level which are shaped by the wider social and 
institutional context. My analysis suggested that the “highest-low” (Andersson 2008) 
fertility in England and Wales might well depend on its flexible, low-wage labour market 
(with easy entry and exit), high levels of inequality, and an income support system with 
benefits that are not generally categorized as family policy but that make it easier for low 
earners to become mothers at young ages even if they have not built up entitlements to 
maternity leave benefits (Sigle-Rushton 2009). In contrast, high earners have strong 
incentives to postpone childbearing and rates of childless are higher than what is observed 
in Scandinavian countries.   
If meaningful diversity can be masked within the boundaries of broad categories  
and if the wider institutional context represents a potentially important modifying factor 
(see also, Shalev 2008), there are both practical and theoretical implications. The sudden 
adoption of the Swedish parental leave model  - as happened recently in  Germany (Geisler 
and Kreyenfeld 2012) -  might, by increasing incentives for low earners to postpone 
childbearing, might actually reduce fertility in England and Wales, at least in the short term. 
Similarly, tax relief for paid domestic work and child care – available in Sweden since 2007 
--  is only feasible if it is affordable. This requires that the purchaser earns (far) more than 
the provider of care (Donath 2000; Himmelweit 2007) .  In labour markets with fairly 
compressed wages – typical of Scandinavian countries --  the option will be feasible for 
only a small segment of the population. The take-up and impact of this new Swedish policy 
(which has been rather low) might be far greater if exported to the UK setting where there is 
far more wage inequality.   
While the implications for issues of policy sharing are readily apparent,  a 
consideration of intra- and inter-categorical complexity has implications for the 
specification of statistical models. If the pattern of moderately high fertility is qualitatively 
different across countries, does it make sense to estimate cross-national regressions of the 
TFR on the indicators of the generosity of family policies? Aggregate measures like the 
TFR may mask substantively relevant cross-national variations in the underlying behaviour 
we are seeking to model  Indeed, a number of demographers have concluded that 
individual-level analyses are better suited for the study of how fertility outcomes respond to 
family policy (e.g. Neyer and Andersson 2008; Rønsen 2014). By focusing attention on the 
data generating process, a consideration of intersectionality problematizes individual-level 
analyses which rely on average levels of social expenditure (Kalwij 2010) or an indicator of 
the average (or some other “representative”). Measures of average social expenditure which 
do not account for the details of how that expenditure is accessed (the details of entitlement) 
and allocated  fail to capture variations in the design and delivery of policies as they are 
experienced by individual decision makers. These concerns have been well articulated in 
other disciplines. Welfare regimes were developed, in part, as a response to concerns about 
the use of crude social expenditure measures and represent an effort to develop theoretically 
grounded conceptual measures which reflect “more fine-grained distinctions among patterns 
of social provision” (Pierson 1996: 150) that vary across national contexts. This sort of 
variation is a particular concern in the case of family policy which involves a vast array of 
policies, each complex in their design and delivery (Gauthier 2002; Thévenon 2011). Even 
if we could easily identify and separate out what is “family policy” from other policy, 
which my analysis of England and Wales suggests is not entirely straightforward, it is not 
clear that the average level of expenditure is in any way a valid indicator of the reduction in 
the direct costs of childbearing that the average person could anticipate. Moreover the 
extent to which it falls short of this interpretation may vary across countries depending on 
the way their policies are designed.   
3.2 Recognizing Power 
Drawing on critical and feminist perspectives, more generally, feminist demographers have 
challenged  the belief that demography is conducted by value-free researchers who engage 
with hard facts to arrive at objective conclusions (Riley 1998; Williams 2010). Once we 
concede that objectivity is neither realistic not attainable, we must consider the role of the 
researcher in the production of knowledge.  For example, at recent debate on low fertility in 
Europe, Gerda Neyer (2011) pointed out that: 
it is demographers, politicians, the media, or other groups of people or public 
institutions who produce the perception that fertility levels are too “low” or too 
“high” or “normal.” Likewise, it is they who construct the social, economic, and 
political consequences of fertility levels by transforming demographic measures 
into ostensibly negative outcomes for the future…. (237). 
This suggests that the interests and perceptions of the demographer merit close 
consideration.   Intersectionality provides a reflexive tool that can direct and focus those 
efforts.   
Accepting the basic premise of intersectionality means acknowledging that power 
hierarchies not only stratify two supposedly homogenous groups -- ‘women’ and ‘men’ -- 
but that power hierarchies are also involved in determining whose experiences count and 
who gets to speak on behalf of ‘women’ (Spelman 1988, pg. 77-79).    For example, with 
insufficient reflection, it becomes easy to use descriptive terms like “woman friendly” to 
refer to policies that (predominantly) benefit particular groups of women (most likely those 
that resemble the person uttering the phrase). Many feminist researchers who would not 
otherwise support regressive redistributive measures strongly endorse high levels of wage 
replacement in parental leave policies which, by their very nature, provide more resources 
to (already) well-resourced families.    
Similar biases and “solipsisms” can shape the way explanatory variables are 
deployed and interpreted.  For example, it might not be immediately obvious to a white, 
well-educated, and otherwise privileged researcher that the socio-economic benefits that 
accompany fertility postponement could be higher for some women than others. Education 
and career opportunities, discrimination, and rapidly declining health might modify the net 
benefits of delay for some ethnic minority groups and, as a consequence, the meaning 
attached to measures of early or late motherhood may be qualitatively different for 
particular subpopulations (Goisis and Sigle-Rushton 2014).  Informed only with summary 
statistics or parameter estimates that reflect the average experiences of the wider (larger) 
population and viewed through the lens of our own (often privileged) experience, she might 
conclude that some groups of women are behaving “irrationally” and should be encouraged 
to delay parenthood (or to marry (Sigle-Rushton and McLanahan 2004)) without asking 
whether they are likely to benefit in the same way from the processes thought to be attached 
to that behavioural change. The result of such errors of representation could be unhelpful or 
even harmful policy innovations. 
4. Conclusions 
In the past decades, intersectionality has transformed feminist theory and politics which, as 
part of a larger theoretical movement, has influenced the way research is conducted in most 
of the social sciences.   Although demographic research relies to a great extent on the 
theoretical perspectives of other disciplines, there is little evidence that these critical 
perspectives have been embraced or integrated in any meaningful way. Instead, 
demography appears to have embraced the methods and methodological priorities of 
economics, in a way that has limited its scope, its methodological range and, as a 
consequence, its potential contribution to knowledge.   
While demographers have paid increasingly careful attention to important issues of 
causality, selection, and unobserved heterogeneity, I would maintain that it is equally 
important to consider what those findings mean and how they can be put to use. Critical and 
feminist perspectives when applied as critical methodological lens, could add some much-
needed breadth and depth to demographic scholarship. They might inspire a new 
appreciation for previous demographic methodologies – descriptive and group-focused -- 
which were increasingly set aside as we moved into the era of independent variable. 
Similarly, case study approaches which delve more into both the social context and the 
detail of policies and which  seek to understand any differential treatment and incentive 
effects, can be used  to build theory and to inform the design and interpretation of 
subsequent studies. Neither approach provides solid evidence of causality, but both could 
help generate testable hypotheses which would help us tease out meaningful causal 
relationships in creative ways. We can and should make use of findings from studies in 
other disciplines which apply these approaches, but I would like to see more work of this 
kind carried out by demographers, guided by our own research interests and questions and 
published in the pages of top demography journals.   
To be clear, I am not calling for a rejection of what I see as the dominant economic 
perspective and approach that characterizes much of the extant literature in demography, 
but rather an uncritical, almost internalized acceptance of some aspects of it. It is time to 
worry when certain ways of thinking, certain approaches, and certain priorities are 
internalized to the point that they go without saying whatever the question, whatever the 
underlying motivation for asking it, and however many additional complexities we 
acknowledge might be relevant. If and when this happens, a more interdisciplinary critical 
perspective can be a valuable, if somewhat disruptive and importunate friend.   
Of course, many of the critiques I discuss could be identified and developed without 
making any explicit reference to intersectionality or critical theoretical perspectives more 
generally. In an excellent methodological reflection which was described as “Drawing on 
sociological and political science research, [to] outline how studies of the effects of policies 
are best designed conceptually and methodologically in order to measure potential effects or 
non-effects of the policies.” (700), Neyer and Andersson (2008) touch on many of the same 
issues that I identify in my analysis.10 My core argument is not that everyone should adopt 
and apply the particular conceptual tool that I utilize here, but rather that demography 
would benefit, one way or another, from (more) critical reflection. It is possible, without the 
(explicit) assistance or prompt of a theoretical tool, to think critically about our motivations, 
                                                            
10 This is to be expected because sociology and political science have been rather more influenced by 
critical race and feminist perspectives than demography which, in turn, draw on the criticisms that 
comprise intersectionality.   
methods and the extent to which they are aligned (e.g.  Neyer 2011; Kravdal 2010). While 
not strictly necessary, good theory can, however, help organize and direct that endeavour. 
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